Justice Daniel J. O'Hern: A Law Clerk's Tribute
Bruce D. Greenberg*
When a New Jersey Supreme Court Justice retires, much is
written about his' contribution to New Jersey jurisprudence in the
form of his written opinions. Justice DanielJ. O'Hern leaves a legacy
of approximately 400 signed majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions. Other pieces in this tribute address the substantial effect of
those decisions on NewJersey law.
A Justice, however, bequeaths another legacy to the judicial
system-a living legacy in the form of his law clerks. Typically, a law
clerk enters a clerkship shortly after completing law school. The
clerkship is his first exposure to the "real world" of legal practice.
The lessons that his Justice imparts, by both his words and actions,
shape the clerk, just as parental instruction influences a child who is
beginning the journey through life. This tribute discusses that legacy
ofJustice O'Hern.
A Supreme Court law clerk learns a great deal of law during a
clerkship. But Justice O'Hern's law clerks learned much more than
legal substance and procedure. In an era in which the Court decried
the incivility of society2 and the nastiness that characterizes so much
of legal practice, Justice O'Hern was a role model to his clerks. The
Justice talked to his clerks about the paths that they should choose,
and he taught them by example both in his dealings with his clerks
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For the sake of simplicity, however, this tribute uses masculine pronouns, although

Justice O'Hern may consider them "a bit dated." See Atlantic City Convention Ctr.
Auth. v. South Jersey Publ'g Co., 135 N.J. 53, 59, 637 A.2d 1261, 1264 (1994).
2 See Ward v. Zelikovsky, 136 N.J. 516, 542,
643 A.2d 972, 985 (1994); cf In reVey,

135 N.J. 306, 315, 639 A.2d 718, 722 (1994) (per curiam) (O'Hern, J., dissenting)
("A bit more intolerance with chronic liars and drug dealers might not be a bad
thing for our society.").
See, e.g., Baxt v. Liloia, 155 N.J. 190, 206-07, 714 A.2d 271, 279 (1998);
Kernan
v. One Washington Park Urban Renewal Assocs., 154 N.J. 437, 467, 713 A.2d 411, 426
(1998) (PollockJ, concurring).
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and in his written opinions. Although Justice O'Hern's instruction
covered numerous areas, a few of his most elementary lessons follow.
Respect the views of others. Justice O'Hern consistently discussed
with his clerks the cases about to be argued. Though most clerks had
little or no legal experience beyond law school, and often not much
more business or other "real world" knowledge, Justice O'Hern
always explored and respected their views.
This same characteristic appears in Justice O'Hern's written
opinions. Judicial decisions, particularly majority opinions, often
read as though the results are inevitable. Those opinions imply that
the "right" answer always has been certain, but merely awaiting
announcement. The best judges, however, perceive that many cases
easily could be decided either way.4 Justice O'Hern's majority
opinions frequently recognize that differing views (whether those of
the losing party, commentators, or dissenting Justices) have merit
and should not be dismissed summarily. 5 From this, Justice O'Hern's
clerks learned that virtually every case has at least two colorable sides.
That lesson applies every day in dealing with clients, whose position
at the center of a legal matter may blind them to the perspective,
valid or not, of the other side.
When disagreeing,emphasize points of agreement. As with any Justice,
at times Justice O'Hern found it necessary to dissent. Yet, his
dissenting opinions often begin by acknowledging aspects of the

The great Judge Learned Hand was wracked with doubt about the correctness
of his opinions. See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THEJUDGE 290,
303-05 (1994). Similarly, Justice RobertJackson of the United States Supreme Court
recognized that Justices of a court of last resort "are not final because [they] are
infallible.... [they] are infallible only because [they] are final." Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson,J., concurring).
5 See, e.g., Martin v. Home Ins. Co., 141 N.J. 279, 289, 290,
661 A.2d 808, 813, 814
(1995) (acknowledging the "sound policy reasons" for a contrary result, and stating
that the "issues involved in this case are close"); Wilson v. Unsatisfied Claim &
Judgment Fund Bd., 109 N.J. 271, 278, 536 A.2d 752, 756 (1988) (recognizing that
the decision was a "close question"); State v. Mulcahy, 107 N.J. 467, 479 n.4, 527 A.2d
368, 374 n.4 (1987) (conceding that the case involved "hard lines to draw"); Schultz
v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, 95 N.J. 530, 539, 472 A.2d 531, 536
(1984) (conceding that "[t]he arguments of the dissent.., are not without appeal").
The same recognition has appeared in Justice O'Hern's concurring and dissenting
opinions. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 115 N.J. 169, 179, 557 A.2d 322, 327 (1989) (per
curiam) (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that there was "no unarguable
answer here"); Woodland Private Study Group v. State, Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
109 N.J. 62, 76, 533 A.2d 387, 394 (1987) (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (stating that
decision was a "close call"); Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485, 498, 497 A.2d 183, 190
(1985) (O'Hern, J., concurring) ("It would be less than candid not to admit how
close is the call in this case.").
4
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majority view with which he agrees.6 Only then, having established
common ground, does he proceed to outline his differences.
There are at least two lessons for clerks to draw from this as they
enter legal practice. First, seeking to reduce differences between the
parties to a litigation may cut down on hostility and build the basis for
an eventual settlement of their differences. Second, in a state with a
relatively small bar, attorneys frequently encounter the same
adversaries. Emphasizing points of agreement in one matter can
build trust that may assist in making the next matter more
manageable.
Disagree without being disagreeable. Too often, United States
Supreme Court opinions are marred by ugly, often personal sniping
among members of that Court." As a winner of the moot court
competition at Harvard Law School, and a successful mayor and state
official, Justice O'Hern has ample rhetorical skills. Yet, a reader
searching Justice O'Hern's opinions, even those in the most hotly
disputed or politically charged cases, will never find an unkind word
for anotherJustice or a lower courtjudge. Nor, of course, did Justice
O'Hern ever treat his clerks uncivilly, even when their views of legal
principles differed from his. The need to resist the basest instincts
that lead to unnecessary adversarial behavior is perhaps the most
important lesson that new lawyers must learn.
Praise others. Justice O'Hern not only treated his law clerks as
colleagues, but he never hesitated to compliment them on good
performance. Similarly, in his opinions, the Justice goes out of his
way to praise attorneys and lower court judges whenever possible. 9
There is no better example of how to work well with others.
6

See, e.g., Sherman v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 143 N.J. 35, 92, 668 A.2d 1036, 1064

(1995) (O'Hern,J., dissenting); Rawlings v. Police Dep't ofJersey City, N.J., 133 N.J.
182, 198, 627 A.2d 602, 610 (1993) (O'Hern,J., dissenting); Burbridge v. Governing
Body of the Township of Mine Hill, 117 N.J. 376, 398, 568 A.2d 527, 539 (1990)
(O'Hern, J., dissenting); Romaine v. Kallinger, 109 N.J. 282, 305, 537 A.2d 284, 295
(1988) (O'Hern,J., dissenting); In reTownship of Bridgewater, 95 N.J. 235, 250, 471
A.2d 1, 8 (1984) (O'Hern, J., dissenting); State v. Silver, 92 N.J. 507, 522, 457 A.2d
463, 471 (1983) (O'Hern,J., dissenting).
In a rare divisive case that generated five separate opinions among the seven
Justices, Justice O'Hern's concurrence sought to harmonize the various opinions by
.suggest[ing] that the differences between the majority and dissentts] may be more
rhetorical than real." MacDougall v. Weichert Co., Realtors, 144 N.J. 380, 406, 677
A.2d 162, 175 (1996) (O'Hern,J., concurring). This represents another example of

Justice O'Hern's philosophy of bridging gaps and building consensus to the extent
possible.
8 For a recent example, see College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
EducationExpense Board, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 2227 n.2, 2228 n.3, 2231-32 (1999).

9 See, e.g., New Brunswick Cellular Tel. Co. v. Borough of S. Plainfield, Bd. of
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Recognize that other lawyers are not perfect. When clerks erred,
Justice O'Hern playfully twitted them, but he never "rubbed it in."
Similarly, Justice O'Hern never forgot the difficulties that face lawyers
in day-to-day practice.'
While properly enforcing legal ethics every bit as strictly as his
colleagues on the Court," Justice O'Hern advocated some flexibility
in the discipline imposed in certain cases on particular facts. 2 From
this realistic view of lawyers, Justice O'Hern's law clerks learned an
important lesson about what to expect from other lawyers and what
may be expected of them.
Recognize that nonlawyers are people, too. It is easy for those trained
in the law to be dismissive of the ability of laypersons to understand
the law. Even while residing on the Olympus of New Jersey law,
Justice O'Hern never lost touch with the common person. '3 Justice
O'Hern taught his clerks that they must not do so either.

Adjustment, 160 N.J. 1, 19, 733 A.2d 442, 452 (1999) (O'Hern, J., dissenting)
(referring to the "excellent judge of the Law Division"); State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1,
9, 575 A.2d 1340, 1344 (1990) (gratuitously identifying the author of an "ably written
Law Division opinion" that was authored over twenty years earlier in an unrelated
case); In reWeiss, Healey & Rea, 109 N.J. 246, 254, 536 A.2d 266, 269 (1988) (stating
that "these are first-class lawyers").
10 See In re Howard, 121 N.J. 173, 185, 578 A.2d 1219, 1225 (1990) (per curiam)
(O'Hern,J., dissenting) (noting the difficulties of solo practice).
1 Most of the Court's attorney disciplinary decisions are unanimous, per curiam
opinions. For an example of a signed majority opinion by Justice O'Hern that
invoked disciplinary procedures against lawyers, see Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,
96 N.J. 336, 337, 476 A.2d 250, 250 (1984). In at least one other instance, Justice
O'Hern would have been more strict than the majority and would have disbarred an
attorney whom the Court merely suspended. See In re Infinito, 94 N.J. 50, 58, 462
A.2d 160, 164 (1983) (O'Hern, J., dissenting). Above all, Justice O'Hern has been
concerned that the Court have "consistent principles of decision" in attorney
discipline cases. In re Pena, Nos. D-113-98, D-222-98, D-232-98, 2000 WL 668942, at
*12 (N.J. May 12, 2000) (O'Hern, J., dissenting); see also In re Litwin, 104 N.J. 362,
370, 517 A.2d 378, 382 (1986) (O'Hern,J., concurring).
1
See In re Valentin, 147 N.J. 499, 505-06, 688 A.2d 602, 605-06 (1997) (per
curiam) (O'Hern, J., dissenting); In re Downer, 144 N.J. 1, 14-16, 675 A.2d 604, 61011 (1996) (O'Hern,J., dissenting); In re Roth, 140 N.J. 430, 449-50, 658 A.2d 1264,
1274-75 (1995) (O'Hern,J., dissenting); In re Howard, 121 N.J. 173, 179-80, 578 A.2d
1219, 1222 (1990) (O'Hern, J., dissenting); cf In re Ravich, Koster, Tobin, Oleckna,
Reitman & Greenstein, 155 N.J. 357, 377, 715 A.2d 216, 226 (1998) (O'Hern, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding a public reprimand improper
when the Court had not previously made clear that the conduct at issue violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct).
13 See, e.g., State v. Moore,
158 N.J. 292, 321, 729 A.2d 1021, 1036 (1999)
(O'Hern, J., dissenting) ("It is one thing for the Court to discuss safe retreat [from
the threat of bodily harm], at its remove from the streets; it is quite another thing to
contemplate a safe retreat from the perspective of the person on the street
confronted with violence and a threat of serious bodily harm.").
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In a 1991 death penalty case,Justice O'Hern recognized that the
public might not understand the nuances of the Court's capital
punishment jurisprudence, and he expressly restated a concept so as
to "get the interested readers to understand the issue."' 4 In another
recent opinion, Justice O'Hern firmly stated that the viewpoint of
jurors as rustics who cannot apply legal concepts should not be the
law of NewJersey. 5 Clerks who absorbed the lesson that nonlawyers
deserve respect will not treat their clients in a patronizing way.
Remember the true purposes of the legal system. Justice O'Hern often
reminded clerks that the justice system does not exist merely to
perpetuate arid rules of law. Instead, he emphasized that the
overarching purposes of the legal system must be served by the
outcome in particular cases.
Justice O'Hern's opinions reflect that same perspective. The
Justice endorsed the viewpoint that even the most fundamental and
indisputable principles must be restated if they are not to be lost
amid the cacophony of legal rules, forms, and procedures."6 As a
result, Justice O'Hern frequently focused on the practical, as well as
the legal, effect of the Court's decisions." His awareness of the real
State v. Dixon, 125 N.J. 223, 251, 593 A.2d 266, 280 (1991).
SeeDeHanes v. Rothman, 158 N.J. 90, 99-100, 727 A.2d 8, 12-13 (1999); cf.State
v. Short, 131 N.J. 47, 65-66, 618 A.2d 316, 325-26 (1993) (O'Hern, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing the need to trust juries to follow a court's
instructions). Justice O'Hern, however, has not ignored the reality that jurors may
have difficulty grasping nuances of the law without adequate instructions from trial
judges. See Campo v. Tama, 133 N.J. 123, 141, 627 A.2d 135, 144 (1993) (O'Hern,J.,
dissenting).
16 See, e.g., Crespo v. Stapf, 128 N.J. 351, 375, 608 A.2d 241,
254 (1992) (O'Hern,
J., dissenting) ("One of our goals should be to simplify the legal process whenever
possible."); In re Executive Comm'n on Ethical Standards Re: Appearance of Rutgers
Attorneys, 116 N.J. 216, 221, 561 A.2d 542, 545 (1989) ("Our task is to have the law
make sense[.]"); Buckley v. Estate of Pirolo, 101 N.J. 68, 83, 500 A.2d 703, 711 (1985)
(O'Hern, J., concurring) ("One of the goals of law is to influence the conduct of
those who contribute to cause harm."); Wunschel v. City of Jersey City, 96 N.J. 651,
664, 477 A.2d 329, 336 (1984) ("Law does not serve abstract goals. It serves the
needs of parties to resolve disputes.").
17 See, e.g., R & R Marketing, L.L.C. v. Brown-Forman Corp.,
158 N.J. 170, 180,
729 A.2d 1, 6 (1999) ("[I]t is not the form of the transaction that should govern a
[liquor] wholesaler's right to restructure its organization... [but] the economic
reality of the restructured organization that will determine a wholesaler's
rights.... ."); State v. Hinds, 143 N.J. 540, 547, 674 A.2d 161, 165 (1996) (rejecting a
"sophisticated argument... that... fails to take into account the reality of the
situation"); Carter-Lincoln Mercury, Inc., Leasing Div. v. EMAR Group, Inc., 135 N.J.
182, 204, 638 A.2d 1288, 1299 (1994) (O'Hern,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("We should consider whether violation of... statutory duties will resolve
the issues before imposing a separate and independent duty that is realistically
beyond the capacity of an insurance department, much less the capacity of an
insurance broker in a small town, to fulfill."); Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483,
14

15
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world effect of those decisions led Justice O'Hern to speak out for
persons whom the legal system has sometimes failed.' Yet Justice
O'Hern properly recognized, with characteristic clarity, that "[in
life, it is not always so easy to see the white hats as it is in cinema.,9
The lesson that lawyers and the judicial system cannot ignore first
principles or practical realities, but may not enshrine subjective
notions of what is "good" either, is one that new lawyers will live every
day that they practice law.
Justice O'Hern never flaunted his vast learning. Instead, his
opinions are clear, concise, and unadorned with frills, leaving his
clerks and other readers to perceive on their own his formidable
brilliance. In this regard, Justice O'Hern's own simple but moving
tribute to Justice Haydn Proctor20 applies equally to the man who gave
it: "[H]is innate modesty and self-effacing manner.., makes difficult
our vision ofJustice Proctor's excellence. It is2 like attempting to see a
distant star when the many lights are nearby.",
Justice O'Hern's fundamental humanity, his willingness to teach,
and his treatment of clerks as colleagues rather than as underlings,
made his clerkships an extremely fulfilling time for those of us
fortunate enough to be selected for them. It was a great pleasure to
502, 621 A.2d 459, 468 (1993) (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's
legal malpractice decision that would "have two lawsuits and two sets of lawyers for
the client"); Landwehr v. Landwehr, 111 N.J. 491, 506, 545 A.2d 738, 746 (1988)
(O'Hern, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority's view was "too metaphysical for
the practical realities of modern marriage"); Continental Trailways, Inc. v. Director,
Div. of Motor Vehicles, 102 N.J. 526, 556, 509 A.2d 769, 785 (1986) (O'Hern, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the need to "look beyond appearance and try to focus upon
the commercial event that is involved here"); cf Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth.
v. Township of W. Milford, 144 N.J. 564, 575, 677 A.2d 747, 753 (1996) ("The time
has long since passed when law can or should rely on [legal] fictions.").
8 See, e.g., L.T. v. NewJersey Dep't of Human Servs., Div. of Family Dev., 134
N.J.
304, 306, 633 A.2d 964, 965 (1993) (concerning "the rights of persons facing eviction
and homelessness"); State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519, 543, 593 A.2d 784, 795-96 (1991)
(O'Hern, J., dissenting) (addressing the suffering of child rape victims); Shackil v.
Lederle Labs., A Div. of Am. Cynamid Co., 116 N.J. 155, 191, 561 A.2d 511, 529
(1989) (O'Hern,J., dissenting) (concerning a child injured by a diptheria-pertussistetanus vaccine); Self v. Board of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 460-61, 453 A.2d 170, 174
(1982)
(O'Hern, J., dissenting) (concerning workers who were denied
unemployment benefits).
19 MehIman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163, 202 n.1, 707 A.2d 1000, 1020 n.1
(1998) (O'Hern,J., dissenting).
20 Like Justice O'Hern, Justice Proctor was a son of Monmouth County who
served with distinction on a Court full of impressive Justices.
21 Proceedings of the Supreme Court of NewJersey,
156 N.J. XLV, LXIX (1997).
(Editor's Note: Mr. Greenberg is not alone in having taken notice of these lines
from Justice O'Hern's tribute to Justice Proctor. See Hon. Alan B. Handler, A Tribute
toJustice: JusticeDanielj O'Hern, 30 SETON HALL L. REv. 1052 at 1060-61 (2000).
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come to chambers every day to work for, and with, the consummate
gentleman, and the gentle man, that is Justice O'Hern. Indeed,
many of us believe that clerking for Justice O'Hern is the best job we
have ever had. He has remained a friend to every one of us, no
matter how many years have passed since our clerkships, and he has
given of himself unstintingly to those clerks who have sought his
counsel on professional or personal matters.
Justice O'Hern's clerks are to be found in private law firms
(large and small), in government service, in corporate legal
departments, and on law faculty. In large measure, whatever
professional successes we have achieved, whatever good we have done
for clients or society, and whatever level of professionalism we have
attained, is attributable to the influence of Justice O'Hern in that
formative clerkship year. We can only try to do still better so that
Justice O'Hern's living legacy will be every bit as impressive as the
valuable inheritance he leaves in the NewJersey Reports.

